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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in game theory have made it possible to
study monetary policy credibility in a structured fashion. Some
have concluded from these models that reputational considerations
substantially discourage the monetary authorities from ever
attempting surprise inflations. Hence legal constraints on money
supply growth are unnecessary and can only be harmful. In this
study, I critically assess a number of alternative models of
monetary policy reputation, including some new variants. The
bulk of the paper is concerned with comparing specific details of
these models. One general conclusion is that although this first
generation of monetary policy reputation models yields a
significant number of important insights, it is premature to
argue that time consistency is not a major issue in the design of
monetary policy institutions. The main problem is that the
models either yield a multiplicity of equilibria, or/and yield
conclusions which are very sensitive to apparently minor changes
in the information structure. Whereas an optimal reputational
equilibrium may arise without any explicit cooperation among
atomistic private agents, it is not (yet) clear why we should
expect them to coordinate on the most favorable equilibrium.
Strategic uncertainty may be an important drawback to







Research on strategic issues in macroeconomic policy design
is proceeding at a rather rapid pace, and there is some risk
involved in any attempt to survey it.1To a very limited
extent, one can anticipate new developments in strategic macro
policy by using the applied game theory literature as a leading
indicator. The limitations stem from the fact that most of the
applied game theory literature has evolved around applications to
industrial organization, and the more literal translations of
these results into macroeconomics have not been very successful.
The problem is partly that the models can be quite sensitive to
the specification of the institutional environment, and more
importantly that abstractions which are plausible in the study of
duopolies are not necessarily plausible in the study of
macroeconomic policy.
It will be convenient to treat monetary policy as our
generic example of macroeconomic policy, in part because much of
the extant literature concentrates on monetary policy. But the
issues raised here are clearly germaine to, say, taxation and
government spending.
Early analyses of the "time consistency" problem of monetary
policy demonstrated the possibility that the government might be
able to increase its own welfare, and in some instances social
welfare, if only it could tie its hands and precommit to a
(perhaps state-contingent) path for the money supply.2This can
be the case even if there are no exogenous disturbances, and even2
if the government is trying to maximize the welfare of the
representative individual. That is, the optimal money supply
rule is not always subgame perfect.3A main theme of the recent
literature is that by focusing on "one-shot" gaines, the early
analyses may have overstated the government's credibility
problems. Because monetary policy involves repeated interactions
between the government and the public, reputational
considerations can mitigate, or even eliminate the time-
consistency problem.
Whereas the current generation of reputational models of
monetary policy have some very appealing features, they also have
one fundamental limitation. Typically, the models either yield a
multiplicity of equilibria, or else yield an equilibrium which is
extremely sensitive to the assumed information structure.
This defect, which is inherited from antecedentgame theory
models, is well known to careful readers of the policy
credibility literature. But because many articles focus perhaps
excessively on the most efficient attainable equilibria, casual
readers may not fully appreciate how important the uniqueness
question may be. It is true that the new reputation models
suggest ways in which the government can be induced to behave
"cooperatively", even when there is no legal mechanism for
enforcing its good behavior. But there is as yet no compelling
argument as to why out of the continuum of reputational
equilibria, the economy will coordinate on a "good" equilibrium
and not a "bad" equilibrium. There is a real sense in which3
these repeated game models replace a cooperation problem witha
coordination problem. Resolution of this question is central to
understanding the implications of time consistency for government
policy.
An extreme reputation view is that time consistency is nota
serious is'sue in policy provided that thegovernment places
significant weight on the future. Hence, because it is virtually
impossible to forsee every type of problem which will confront
society (that is, there is qualitative uncertainty), it is unwise
and unnecessary to try to legally bind thegovernment. A less
sanguine view is that all the of the continuum of equilibriaare
equi-prObable (since we have as yet no theory for choosingamong
them). Of course, if governments have very high discountrates,
the issue is moot; all the reputationaj. equilibria will be
qualitatively similar to the equilibriijni of the one-shotgame.
Some who hold this view have suggested that timeconsistency
problems imply a need to constitutionally constrainmonetary
policy. [An intermediate position is presented in Rogoff
(1985b). I argue that the social institutions which evolve in
response to time consistency problems represent a compromise
between the benefits of complete flexibility and the needfor
precommitment.
In section II, I begin by reviewing the model of central
bank reputation first proposed by Barro and Gordon(1983a).
Their reputation mechanism is a variant of the infinite-horizon
trigger-strategy equilibrii.gn proposed by J. Friedman (1971). In4
a discrete-time version of the model, tAe equilibrium inflation
rate can take on a range of values, with the range depending on
the central bank's discount rate and on the length of the
"punishment" period. The multiplicity of supergame equilibria
can be drastically curtailed by imposing that the public's
expectations of future inflation be continuous in current
inflation. But though this assumption has some appeal, it is not
clear how to rigorously justify it. Also, there is a danger of
throwing out the baby (any good reputational equilibria) with the
bathwater. To further illustrate the multiple equilibrium
problem, I extend the analysis to admit "severe" punishment
strategies analogous to those considered by Abreu (1982). By
allowing for this class of equilibria, I show that it is
possible, for a given discount rate and punishment interval, to
sustain lower inflation rates than would be possible under the
expectations rules considered by Barro and Gordon. It would seem
important to recognize the existence of such equilibria in
evaluating any casual arguments concerning how an equilibrium is
chosen. Severe punishment strategy equilibria are also relevant
when the central bank has private information, as in section Iv.
In section III, I examine the case where the policymaker has
a finite horizon. Unless the equilibrium of the one-shot game is
unique, then it is still possible to have trigger-strategy
equilibria analogous to those considered in section II.
Moreover, even if the range of one-shot game equilibrium
inflation rates is very narrow, the range of repeated game5
equilibria can be very broad. The range again depends on the
policymaker's time horizon and discount rate. It may even be
possible to have an equilibriun where inflation is zero during
the initial periods. It is interesting that these results do not
appear sensitive to the assumption that there is literally a
finite horizon. Qualitatively similar equilibria are shown to
obtain (even when the one-shot game equilibrium is unique) in the
case where the policymaker has an infinite horizon, but heavily
discounts periods which come after the end of his term in office.
An alternative finite-horizon formulation has been developed
by Tabellini (1983), Backus and Driffill (1985), Barro (1986),
and by Horn and Persson (1985). In these analyses, which draw
heavily on the work of Kreps and Wilson (1982), the public is not
certain what type of policymaker they are facing. For this
reason, policymakers who may be tempted by the transitory gains
from unanticipated inflation, have an incentive to pose as hard-
money types. Once the public is certain that the policymaker is
not a hard-money type, inflationary expectations will rise. This
gives "soft-money" types an incentive not to reveal themselves
too early on. A possible advantage of this formulation is that
for some variants, there is a unique equilibrium. There are some
drawbacks, however. The approach requires one to specify priors
for the public, and it is not clear where these come from.
Ideally, one would like to endogenize the evolution of priors
across regimes. Also, superficially minor changes in the
public's beliefs can significantly affect the nature of the6
equilibrium. For example, it matters whether the hard-money type
is someone who places a higher weight on inflation than average,
or whether he is a "robot" who is programmed never to inflate.
In the free-will case, a type who is very tempted to inflate may
never find it worthwhile to pose as a hard-money type. As
Vickers (1985) has shown, the hard-money type may be able to take
actions (deflate temporarily) which separate himself from high
inflation types.
Another possible problem with the adaptations of Kreps and
Wilson's model is that certain of the results might be sensitive
to the assumption that there is a fixed finite horizon. I argue
that it is difficult to find an example in which the the finite-
horizon assumption can be taken literally. Two other features of
the models have attracted criticism, but these criticisms can be
addressed. First, the existing models only allow for two types
of policymakers. Second, the equilibria involve randomizing
strategies. In a self-contained appendix, I illustrate one way
to extend these models to allow for a continuum of types of
policymakers, instead of just two. The model of the appendix has
an equilibrium in pure strategies with pooling. That model also
illustrates the why it is important how the hard-money type(s)
are specified.
In section IV ,Ipresent two views of how private
information may impinge on the analysis. Canzoneri (1985)argues
that it is impossible for the central bank to precisely control
the price level. The Friedman-type reputational equilibria of7
section II cannot be sustained if the public can never directly
observe how much of any given price level change was intentional,
and how much was due to an incorrect forecast of money demand.
Following Green and Porter (1984), and Barro and Gordon (1983a),
Canzoneri demonstrates that it is still possible to have
reputational equilibria, though to sustain them the economy must
suffer periodic reversions to a high inflation equilibrium.
There remain a multiplicity of equilibria. One reason
Canzoneri's analysis is interesting is that it illustrates how
the problem of coordinating on the best equilibrium seems to
become more accute when there is private information. Canzoneri
suggests that if private information is indeed the explanation
behind the economy's periodic bouts with inflation, then attempts
to achieve monetary policy credibility through legislation will
have inherent limitations. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) share
the view that the central bank's private information is
important. They argue, however, that the level of private
information is endogenous. In their model, the central bank has
incentives to adopt imperfect monetary control procedures, so
that it can mask its intentions. Obviously, their theory has
somewhat different implications for institutional reform.
Cukierman and Meltzer show that their model has a unique linear
equilibrium, but do not provide a complete resolution of the
multiple equilibrium problem.
In section V1 I summarize some issues which arise when there
is more than one government controller. In the international8
context, this is relevant because of sovereign governments. In
the domestic context, it may be important when thereare two or
more quasi-independent government agencies, and when thereare
two or more political parties. The introduction ofmultiple
controllers suggests a range of interesting applications, and
adds a new dimension of strategic complexity. In the
conclusions, I ask whether the models of reputation developed to
date are compelling. Can we rely on reputatiorialconsiderations
to accomplish what we once thought could only beaccomplished
through institutional reform?9
II.CREDIBLE MONETARY POLICIES IN THEINFINITE-HORIZON CASE
Inthe first part of this section,I review the "trigger-
strategy" model of monetary policy reputation dueto Barro and
Gordon (1983a). As Barro and Gordonstressed, there are a
multiplicity of equilibria of the type they consider.There are
also other classes of equilibria,as I demonstrate by extending
their analysis to allow for ananalogue of the "severe"
punishment strategies identified by Abreu(1982) (in a different
context). I then speculate on how itmay ultimately be possible
to modify these models to producemore definite results.
The framework for analyzingmonetary policy credibility i
will employ is a slight variant ofa popular example due to
Kydland and Prescott (1977). One justificationfor using this
extremely simple model is that it forms the basis forvirtually
all the literature surveyed below.Obviously one would want to
use a more fully articulated model forpurposes of applied policy
analysis. But the Kydland and Prescottexample is very
convenient for illustrating strategicfactors, which may easily
become obscured in a more complex model.4
Monetary policy can have real effects in our model because
private agents form expectations of period tinflation, based
on t -1information.5 it is important toemphasize that the
atomistic agents are "expectations takers". Theaggregate
inflation rate, it,isexogenous to the individual; he can only
affect his own price predictionerror, t -(mei).I stress10
this point because in the analysis below, it is easy to become
confused into thinking that individuals are setting their
expectations strategically. What is true is that there are
equilibria in which the collective actions of private agents have
a strategic effect on the government's choice of monetary policy.
But these equilibria do not require any explicit cooperation
within the private sector. Any individual who "defects" and
tries setting his expectations differently will only be punishing
himself.
The fact that the individual cannot affect the aggregate
inflation rate or the aggregate prediction error does not
necessarily imply that these factors do not enter his utility
function.6 Consider the case, for example, where there is an
externality arising from income taxation. When other citizens
are "tricked" into working too much, or into holding too high a
level of real money balances, the individual gains because
government revenues rise. However, it never pays for the
individual to try to intentionally guess wrong himself. Thus we
will assume that an individual attempts to minimize7
= -(nei)]2 (1)
In most of the monetary policy credibility literature, it is
assumed that unanticipated inflation increases output (via a
contracts or an islands model). Many parallel issues arise when
unanticipated inflation matters because the government issues11
currency or non-indexed nominal bonds. I will assume that the




where k > 0, f'(), g'()0 as ()0,and f'(), g'() -0as
()-* o. a isthe monetary authorities' subjective discount
rate, and T is their time horizon. 1- Tt isthe average level
of private sector price prediction errors. For now, we will
assume that T is infinite and that f"(), g"() > 0; both
assumptions will be relaxed in section III. The basic structure
underlying eqs. (1) and (2) has been extensively examined [see
Barro and Gordon (1983a,b), Canzoneri (1985), Rogoff (1985b) or
Tabellini (1983)]. Barro and Gordon discuss how in the presence
of externalities such as income taxation (our example above), the
government's objective function can be interpreted as the social
welfare function, even though k >0.Note that if k =0,then
there is no externality, the government will always try to set
=e,and the optimal monetary rule is subgame perfect.
Before considering repeated-game reputational equilibria, it
is useful to first examine equilibria of the "one-shot" game
(there is only one period). Because the private sector forms
expectations about period t inflation based on t -1information,
the central bank treats (The) as given when setting
Minimizing Q over it,weobtain the first-order condition12
-f'(m -- k)=g'(n).Since the public forms expectations
rationally, we require that it =11e•Hence, a necessary condition
for a subgame perfect equilibrium in the one-shot game is
—f'(—k) =gu(u*) (3)
where it is the one-shot game equilibrium inflation rate. Given
our assumptions that f", g" > 0, it is straightforward to show
that the second-order conditions hold and that it is unique. The
logic underlying the equilibrium characterized by (3) is well
known. The central bank always has the ability to inflict price
prediction errors on the private sector. But when e = >0,
it will never choose to do so.8As inflation rises so too does
the marginal cost of inflating. The time-consistent equilibrium
level of inflation, rt', is sufficiently high so that the marginal
gain from surprise inflation equals the marginal cost.
In this nonstochastic model, the fact that the central bank
can exercise discretion brings no benefits, and only leads to a
high rate of inflation. Recall that private agents do care about
the aggregate inflation rate. However, because an individual's
actions have only an infinitesimal effect on the aggregate price
level, each agent acts as if he were only concerned with his own
price-prediction error. Whether or not the economy will
coordinate on a more favorable equilibrium (without imposing
legal restraints) is the main focus of our investigation. The
equilibrium characterized by (3) is of interest for a number of13
reasons. First, it is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
when the monetary authorities maximize overany finite horizon
(if, as in our example, the equilibrium of the one-shot game is
unique.) Moreover, m remains an equilibrium when their horizon
is infinite. Second, in the infinite-horizoncase, the one-shot
game equilibrium can serve as a credible threat to induce more
"cooperative" behavior from the monetary authorities. We will
now illustrate this point. This class of reputational equilibria
was demonstrated by Barro and Gordon (1983a).
Consider a level of inflation, if,suchthat 0 ￿ C rt, and
suppose that the public forms expectations according to




Thus if (rte)_l =ifC its', the public will continue expecting
low inflation as long as the central bank "cooperates" and does
not try to fool them.9 If the central bank ever does inflate
beyond ñ, the economy will be subjected to a "punishment"
interval, which we have arbitrarily set at one period. (When
> if =(me)_l,e reverts to rt*.If the central bank then
*e - setsmt =it,itreverts back to it.) It is very important to
note that the public's expectations are rational in the subgame
which would occur if the central bank were ever to "cheat". The
central bank has absolutely no incentive to surprise private
* agents during a punishment period. For by setting it =itduring14
a punishment period, it minimizes both this period's loss
function, and next period's inflationary expectations.)
We shall now confirm that there are indeed equilibria where
the public forms its expectations according to (4), and where
ft < Tt. To determine whether ft is a trigger-strategy equilibrium
level of inflation under (4), it is necessary to consider whether
the central bank will have any incentive to defect and set rt ft.
This question turns on the magnitude of the maximum current-
period gain from defecting, B(ft), in comparison with the expected
future cost to defecting, c(ft). These magnitudes are given by
B(ft) =f(—k)+ gift) —f[TLD(ft)—ft—k]—g[TLD(ft)]> 0,(5)
where D(ft) =argmin[f(rt-ft-k)+ g(rt)], and
C(ft) =3[g(*)—g(ft)]c 0. (6)
For a given level of ft to be an equilibrium, it is necessary that
B(ft) ￿ C(fl); otherwise the central bank will always choose to
defect. Though ñ =0may not be an equilibrium 10, it is
possible to prove that there always exists some ft such that
o ￿ ft c and B(ft) ￿ C(ft).[Proof:ft c itD(ff) < by
fU, g" > 0. Let ft =- c.Since .ft(L) -ft-k)=g'(&),and
since &— ftC c, then B(ft) must become second order as e becomes
small (by an envelope theorem argument). Since C(ft) remains
first-order for small c then, by the continuity of f and g, there15
* * mustexist some c > 0 such that B(it -s)S C(rt-s).]
Denote ñasthe lowest (positive) inflation rate which can
be a trigger-strategy equilibrium level of inflation under (4).
It is trivial to show that ft is nortincreasing in 3, the central
bank's discount rate. It is also simple to show that if ft>0,
then it would be possible to have lower inflation if the
expectations mechanism of the public embodied a punishment
interval longer than just one period. If the discount rate 3 is
small, however, even an infinite punishment interval may not be
enough to sustain zero inflation.1'
When ft > 0, there is another mechanism for sustaining a
lower inflation rate, one which does not involve extending the
punishment period. The alternative mechanism involves having a
more severe punishment, instead of a more prolonged punishment.
The more severe punishment consists of reverting to an inflation
rate higher than it whenever the central bank defects. In some
applications, this alternative mechanism may be important because
it is not intuitively appealing to have a long or infinite
punishment interval. Also, severe punishments can play a role in
the optimal equilibriun of the model with private information,
which will be studied in section IV.I do not, however, regard
severe punishment equilibria as being particularly plausible in
the present context. My primary motivation for introducing this
alternative class of equilibria here is to underscore the16
severity of the multiple equilibriujn problem.Thus it is
sufficient merely to illustrate theequilibria, and we will not
concern ourselves with deriving the optimalsevere punishment
equilibriua.
To make the mechanism underlyingsevere punishment
equilibria more transparent, it is helpfulto first demonstrate
why it is possible for inflationaryexpectations to rise
temporarily above rt'.Let 8 > 0, and consider thefollowing path
of expectations initiating in periodt:
=it+ 5,
(7)
(ue)+ =ftif rtt+j..l =(ne)+_1, i ￿ 1
(*otherwise.
* . .. Sinceg(rt )- g(rc)is finite, it is clearly possible to
choose a 5 small enough so that it + 8 isan equilibriun for
period t, provided that the public'sexpectations are governed by
(7). It is true that at rt + 8, thecentral bank would be
willing to let output drop below the naturalrate in order to
achieve lower current-period inflation.But the central bank
knows that it must be willing to sufferthrough exceptionally
high inflation in period t if it wants inflationin t + 1 to be
ft, and not The fact that *+5 can be made a credible
threat implies that it is possible toattain an inflation rate
lower than ft without extending thepunishment interval. For
example, consider an equilibrinjn analogous to (4):17
(ue) = = (e)1 (8)
ç+ &otherwise. 12
It is clear that the lowest attainable inflation rate under(8)
is lower than the lowest attainable inflation rate under(4),
(ft), if ft 0.
The trigger-strategy equilibria we have beenanalyzing do
not require any explicit cooperation between the privateagents,
or between the private sector and the central bank. Ifan
atomistic private agent believes that other agents form
inflationary expectations according to (4) [or (8)], then it is
only rational for him to form expectations the sameway (if the
equilibrium is subgame perfect).13However, although these low-
inflation equilibria do not require explicit cooperationacross
individual agents, there is a serious question of howagents
coordinate on a particular equilibriujr. First, what is the
length of the punishment interval going to be? Given the length
of the punishment interval, is thereany reason to suppose that
the public will expect the lowest equilibriwn inflation rate
corresponding to this punishment interval? Even if we assume
that the public can coordinate on the punishment interval andcan
agree to expect the lowest credible level of inflation, there is
still a degree of indeterminacy. Will =ft,the lowest
attainable inflation rate under (4), or will the publicexpect
the lower inflation rate attainable under a severe punishment
strategy such as (8)?18
It might be argued that by making pronouncements about its
monetary policy, the government can focus the private sector's
attention on a particular equilibrium. But I, for one, am
extremely uncomfortable with this reasoning. The government has
obvious incentives to make false announcements, and the public is
not likely to pay attention to statements that are not backed by
concrete measures. A somewhat more serious alternative is to
explore whether the goverment can achieve some degree of
coordination by placing external restraints on itself. (Such as
making a commitment to a fixed exchange rate system which, if
violated, would lead to a breakdown of a tariff agreement.) This
resolution, of course, really amounts to changing the structure
of the game so that there are less equilibria.
Perhaps the most implausible feature of the equilibria
considered in this section is that (except for the one-shot game
equilibrium), they require that the public's expectations about
future inflation be discontinuous functions of current inflation.
If the government defects by a small amount, expected inflation
rises by just as much as if the government were to inflate
massively. It would seem worthwhile exploring assumptions which
imply that continuous changes in the environment lead to
continuous changes in the public's beliefs about future
inflation, Whereas it may still be possible to have reputational
equilibria with continuous reaction functions, the severity of
the multiple equilibrium problem might be significantly
diminished. [For a discussion along these lines within the19
context of 1-0 models, see Gui, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986)
Stanford (1986) provides some suggestive results.] Yet another
approach to placing restrictions on the possible equilibria is to
recognize that agents cannot make an unlimited number of
calculations; see, for example, Rubinstein (1986).
The analysis above is readily generalized to the stochastic
case, if information is symmetric.(In section VI, we shall
consider the case of asymmetric information.) Barro and Gordon
(1983a) have illustrated some of the possibilities which can
arise. The optimal trigger-strategy equilibria will involve
having the public make (unforecastable) price prediction errors.
When a disturbance causes the benefits to unanticipated inflation
to be unusually high, the monetary authorities engineer a
surprise inflation. Expectations of inflation are still correct,
on average, because the monetary authorities spring surprise
deflations when the benefits are low. It should be noted that
because the models studied in this section have multiple
equilibria, they can generate variable or stochastic inflation
even in a completely unchanging environment. It is possible to
have trigger-strategy equilibria which bounce back and forth
between different points either with certainty, or with reference
to an extrinsic random variable (sunspots).20
III. REPUTATION IN A FINITE-HORIZON CONTEXT
The trigger-strategy equilibria discussed in thepreceeding
section break down if the monetary authorities maximizeover a
finite horizon. (Because only the one-shotgame equilibriujn can
obtain in the last period, the strategies "unravel"backwards.)
It has been suggested that this may be an importantproblem,
because policyniakers have finite terms in office.Before
questioning the merits of this view, we will discuss some
mechanisms for modelling reputation in the finite-horizoncase.
First of all, if there are multiple equilibria in theone-
shot game, then there can exist trigger-strategyequilibria in
the finite-horizon case. Benoit and Krishna(1985), and Friedman
(1985), have demonstrated this general principle. Infact, even
if only a narrow range of high inflation ratescan obtain in the
one-shot game, it is still possible to sustain inflationrates
very close to zero early in the policymaker's term (if his term
is long enough and his discount factor lowenough). Let > 0
be the lowest equilibrinjn inflation rate in theone-shot game,
and let rt2 be the highest. During the policymaker'sfinal period
in office, period T, the equilibria are thesame as in the one-
shot game. Hence, 111￿1'T However, in period T - 1, it
may be perfectly rational for the public to believe that
(ue)T_l =.
-e,e >0.For small enough s, these expectations
can supported by the belief that if the government doesnot
defect in T -1(mT_i =ft1 - e),then (1te)T =n1.If it defects21
- h then(lte)T = Hencedefection is punished by
going to the "bad" Nash equilibrium in the final period. Let
denote the lowest subgame perfect equilibrium which can be
attained in period s. It is straightforward to show that if
(it')5 > 0, then (it')5 -(rc')..1> 0. (I am implicitly assuming
that the discount rateis constant.) The more periods that
remain, the longer the punishment interval can be. Also, as we
move back from date T, the maximum one-period punishment,
it2 -(u'),rises. To be more concrete, we present an example:
Suppose one replaces the central bank's inflation loss
function, g(rt) [see eq. (2b)], with the following loss function
7g(rt)
for it ￿ m" + k,
h(rt) = g(it + k) for rt + k C it ￿ z, (9)
+ k) + g(m -z)for z C it,
where z is a sufficiently large constant such that
* - f'[-(k + z)] ￿ g'(rt + k). If we replace g() with h(s) in
equation (2b) then, as one can easily confirm, there are two
equilibria in the one-shot game, rt* and + z. Now let us
assume that the central bank maximizes over a two-period horizon,
and that it does not discount second-period welfare (B= 1).
Consider what happens if the public forms expectations of it as
follows:22
(ne)Tl =0
(ne)T = Ttrtji_j￿ 0, (10)
+ zotherwise.
When confronted with the inflationexpectations mechanism (10),
the central bank will ratify the public's beliefsand set
= 0. If it sets rtTl > 0, then it will beara cost in
period T of h(rt* + z) -h(rt*)which, by construction of h, is
equal to g(* + k). This cost outweighsany possible gain. The
gain to inflating in period T -1is strictly less than
f(-k) -f(0),which is strictly less than g(Tt* + k) -g(rt*).
Hence e = 0 is a subgame perfect equilibrius forperiod T -1.
As in the infinite-horizon case, thereare a multiplicity of
equilibria. For example, any inflation rate less than itbut
greater than zero can be equilibriuni for period T -1.
It is interesting to observe that an analogousequilibritjni
arises in the case where (a) the one-shotgame equilibrim is
unique, and (b) the policymalcer does not literally havea finite
horizon, but heavily discounts events which willoccur he after
leaves office. Suppose, for example, thatwe replace the
policymaker's loss function, (2a), with the alternative function
= E L5t3(s)(5t),
(11)
where L5 is again given by equation (2b), butnow 13(s) = 1 for
s S T, and (s) = e for s > T, with c beingvery small. In his
final period in office, T, the lowest attainabletrigger-strategy23
equilibrium level of it,fI1will be very close to its', since
future periods are discounted very heavily. (This assertion is
easily confirmed.) Nevertheless, the small wedge between fi,1. and
u' is sufficient to support a level of inflation UT_i <1'Tvia
the same general argument as above. If the policymaker's term is
long enough, it will be possible to credibly sustain a very low
inflation rate during his initial periods in office.
A rather different model of monetary policy credibility is
based on the assumption that the public is unsure about the
policymakers' preferences or about his cost of breaking
commitments. A number of researchers have adopted this approach,
applying the framework of Kreps and Wilson (i982). Barro's
(1986) version of the model is roughly as follows:
The policymaker has a fixed term in office. His horizon is
finite either because he has no reason to care what happens to
social welfare after his departure, or because he believes that
his actions do not affect the credibility of the monetary
authorities in future periods. Upon entering office, the
policymaker makes a commitment never to inflate. The public
thinks there is at least a small chance that the policymaker is a
"type 1", for whom it is prohibitively expensive to break his
commitment.Otherwise the policymaker is a "type 2", who bears
no costto breaking commitments. (In the appendix, I extend the
model to allow for a continuum of types.) Barro shows that if
termsof office are long enough, then there will be no inflation
in the early periods of a term regardless of which type the24
policymaker actually is. At some point,depending on the
public's initial priors on the policyma]cer'stype, the type 2
policymaker begins to randomize his behavior,inflating with a
time-dependent, endogenously-determined probability.At the
point randomization begins, private sectorexpectations of
inflation rise by a discrete amount (becausethere is now some
chance inflation will occur). As long as thepublic continues to
observe zero inflation, expected inflation fluctuatesaround a
constant level. If the public ever observesany inflation, then
it knows the policymaker is a type 2, andexpected inflation
rises to its one-shot game level rt'.
Two features of this scenario seem odd at firstglance, but
appear more reasonable upon closer inspection. First, it is not
very appealing to think of the central bank as flipping a coin to
decide whether or not to inflate. Thisaspect of the model is,
in part, attributable to the fact that thereare a discrete
number of types. In the model of the appendix, which hasa
continuum of types, there does exist a pure strategyequilibrium.
A second "odd" characteristic of the model is that the
expected rate of inflation rises only at the beginning of the
randomization interval, and then remains constant until the
public actually observes inflation. This is the result of two
offsetting effects. On the one hand, the public knows thata
type 2 policymaker is more likely to inflate as the end of the
term approaches, and will certainly inflate in the lastperiod.
Offsetting this effect is the fact that each time a periodpasses25
and no inflation occurs, the public raises its probability that
it is indeed facing a type 1 (precommitted) policymaker. This
result is not general. In the model of the appendix, it is
possible to have expected inflation rise over the period in which
the policymaker might break his commitment.
Also, if one conditions expectations only on information
available to the public in period zero, then the path of expected
inflation does indeed rise over the randomization interval.
During the randomization interval, the cumulative probability
that the type 2 policymaker will have revealed himself by the end
of any given period rises over time. Once he reveals himself,
then inflation rises to rt.
For any initial set of public beliefs, the model discussed
above yields a unique equilibrium. However, the public's priors
are a "free parameter" which have an important effect on the
predictions of the model. Also, as Vickers (1986) has shown, it
makes a considerable difference whether a type 1. agent is someone
who legally binds himself to a fixed target inflation rate, or
whether he is someone prefers low inflation because he places a
greater weight on inflation than average. In the latter case,
the hard-money type may be able to signal his type by deflating.
If there are not too many periods left, a type 2 policymaker may
prefer to unmask himself rather than suffer a large deflation. A
type 1 agent, on the other hand, finds the sacrifice worthwhile
if it proves his type to the public. Thus in the separating
equilibrium, type 2 policymakers set inflation at rC. Type 126
policymakers initially deflate. Then,having separated
themselves, they inflate at some low level (whichdepends on the
relative weight they place on inflationversus unemployment). In
a richer institutional setting, hard-moneytypes might have other
ways to send separating signals of their type.(They can send
signals via the budget deficit, they canappoint conservatives to
govern the central bank, etc.) The issue of whetheror not all
policymakers have at least some discretion also arisesin the
model of the appendix.
Possibly the least robust results for this class ofmodels
are those pertaining to the policymaker's finalperiods in
office, the "endplay" of the model. These resultsmay be
sensitive to the assumption that the policymakerhas a known
finite horizon, an assumption I willnow argue is seldom
plausible. First of all, let us consider thecase where type 2
policymakers genuinely care only about the socialwelfare
function, (2), and where society's horizon is infinite.It is
true that for any one play of thegame, the public will be better
of f when the policymaker actually turnsout to be a type 2.
[(Since the one-time inflation surprise raisessocial welfare;
see Barro (1986).] However, the public is also betteroff the
higher its initial subjective probability that thepolicymaker is
actually a type 1. And it seems implausible fora type 2
policymaker to think that his actions this term will haveno
effect on the public's probability distributionover types in
future periods, and hence on future socialwelfare.27
It is true that a policymaker's actions would not affect the
public's beliefs about future policymakers, if his successor is
drawn at random from a very large population, and if the public
has very strong priors about the relative distribution of type 1
and type 2 agents in this population. But it seems (to me) more
plausible to think that the policymakers are chosen via some
nonrandom process. The observation that the latest Fed chairman
was a type 2 ought to influence the public's priors as to the
nature of his successor. So if the policymaker really cares about
social welfare, he should take into acdount the effects of his
actions on future periods.
It is entirely possible that the policymaker does not care
at all about social welfare, and only aims to maximize his
seigniorage revenues while in office. There may be many
countries where this scenario is plausible, but in these
countries, policymakers usually do not have fixed one-time terms
in office. Moreover, the length of their terms in office is
probably not exogenous.
Another rationale for the policymaker's fixed finite
perspective might be the electoral cycle. Backus and Drif fill
(1985) note (only in passing) that their model yields something
akin to a political business cycle. On average (that is,
averaging over both type 1 and type 2 policymakers), inflation
tends to be higher towards the end of a term. There is no
tendency for output to be high on average before elections; the
booms which occur during the regimes of type 2 agents are28
cancelled out by the recessions whichtake place under type 1
agents. A problem with an electoral cydleinterpretation of the
model is that it contradictsempirical evidence that pre-electjon
distortions in policy are mostsevere when the incumbent is up
for re-election, not during his finalterm in office.
Rogoff and Sibert (1986) present anequilibrj signaling model
in which the electoral cycle inmacroeconomic policy arises
precisely because the incumbent party isstriving to stay in
power.29
IV.PRIVATE INFORMATION
Thusfar, we have assumed that the public can perfectly
monitor the central bank's actions. Canzoneri (1985), and
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), have analyzed the implications of
relaxing this assumption. In this case, achieving the
coordination necessary to attain optimal reputational equilibria
seems even more problematic. The studies considered in this
section are also interesting because they have implications for
attempts at institutional reform. We will first consider
Canzoneri' s model.
Canzoneri analyzes an infinite-horizon model similar to the
model of section II. He assumes that the central bank does not
discount the future (= 1),so that (for a long enough
punishment interval) there always exists a trigger-strategy
equilibrium in which expected inflation is zero. He then
introduces money demand shocks into the model. These shocks are
observed only after the central bank has set the money supply.
However, the central bank is able to condition its actions on a
forecast of the money demand disturbance. Its forecast is
imperfect, so the central bank would be unable to completely damp
out price fluctuations even if it were trying to minimize the
price prediction errors of private agents.
If the public is able to observe both the money demand
disturbance and the central bank's forecast of it, then no new
conceptual issues arise. There are trigger-strategy equilibria30
analogous to those of section II (forstochastic versions of the
models). As long as the publiccan always directly confirm that
any unanticipated inflation is entirelyattibutable to an error
the central bank made inforecasting, there is no need to
"execute" any punishment.(Technically, of course, private
agents do not act strategically, and thereis no explicit
cooperation among them.) Canzoneriargues, however, that it
might be very difficult for thepublic to directly confirm the
central bank's forecast, and thatthis forecast should betreated
as private information.14 He thenshows, by applying Green and
Porter's (1984) extension of Friedman's
trigger-strategy model,
that it is still possible to havean equilibrium which improves
on the outcome of the one-shot game.'5
In the equilibri Canzonerianalyses, the public sets
expected inflation equal tozero, as long as the economy is not
entering a reversionary (punishment)period. The public then
observes actual inflation, andemploys a one-tailed test. If
inflation is above a certainthreshold value, then there willbe
a one-period reversion to theinflation-rate expectations of the
one-shot game. If the threshold isset at just the right level,
the central bank can be inducedto target zero inflation.16 (In
setting the level of the moneysupply, the central bank must
trade off increases in currentemployment with increases in the
Probability of entering a reversionaryperiod.) Even though the
central bank does not cheat (in
equilibrium), large money demand
forecast errors still occur
Periodically, thereby throwing the31
economy into periods of high expected inflation.
As in the model of section II, there is a multiplicity of
other equilibria, and it is not clear how or why the public would
coordinate on this particular one. It is not satisfactory to
argue that this equilibrium is somehow "focal" becauseit is
optimal. For one thing, the optimal equilibrium does not, in
general, have such a simple structure. (Note that punishments
actually occur in this model. So even if different punishment
strategies yield the same level of expected inflation, they do
not necessarily yield the same level of welfare.) Abreu, Pierce
and Stacchetti (1985) have shown that optimal punishment
strategies in the Green-Porter model typically involve an
analogue of the severe punishment strategies discussed in section
II. They also show that the optimal strategies are not, in
general, based on a simple one-tailed test (though the one-tailed
test equilibrium is intuitively appealing). That the optimal
trigger strategies can be so complicated, even when the
underlying model has a relatively simple structure, is further
reason to avoid loose arguments that the public will coordinate
on the best equilibrium.
Canzoneri's model has some attractive features and some, at
least superficially, odd features. By introducing private
information, Canzoneri is able to explain why there must be some
inflationary bias (on average) even if the public can coordinate
on the best attainable equilibrium. Also, the model illustrates
how serially uncorrelated forecast errors can produce serially32
correlated inflation rates: Reversionary periods followa
cooperative period in which inflation was high. On the negative
side, the public's expectations mechanism does not seem
particularly plausible. The public finds itself punishing the
central bank periodically, even though it knows that the central
bank would never cheat (in equilibrium). Whenever the central
bank inadvertently allows inflation to slip above its threshold
value, the public must punish it by discontinuously raising
inflation-rate expectations. The punishment isnecessary in
order to induce the central bank to continue to target low
inflation in the future. Note that the public never actually
learns anything about the policymaker's type; it knows everything
at the outset and knows that it would never pay for the central
bank to defect from the equilibrium. Canzoneri's model should
not be interpreted as one in which the central bank has private
information about its preferences. His model has quite different
properties than the models discussed in the latter part of
section III.
Canzoneri treats the, information structure as exogenous.
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) suggest that the central bankmay
deliberately saddle itself with an inefficient forecasting
technology, in order to mask its intentions. Their basic
argument may be illustrated in the following one-period model:
Let the central bank's objective function take the specific
functional form:33
I. =-x(u-The)÷ (12)
(Cukierman and Meltzer do not interpret the central bank's loss
function as a social welfare function.) It is easily seen that
in a one-shot game, the equilibrium inflation rate =x.It is
helpful to note that for the loss function (12), the centralbank
will set it= xregardless of the value of ne.
A key element of Cukierman and Meltzer's result is the
assumption that the central bank's preferences are stochastic.
Suppose, for example, that based on time t -1information, x =0
in period t with probability 4, and that x =2in period t with
probability 4. If the private sector is able to observe x before
setting e, then Et_i(Lt) =4(0)+4(2)=1.[Thus Et_i(L)t is
the expected value of the central bank's period t objective
function, prior to the realization of x.] If the private sector
is unable to observe x before setting 1e, then e =1,and
=4(0)+4(0)=0.Therefore if the central bank can
precommit itself not to reveal x before the public sets The, it
will choose to do so. Hiding its preferences does not allow the
central bank to systematically fool the private sector, who can
still guess inflation correctly, on average. Rather, the central
bank gains because it is able to cause surprise inflation when
the benefits to inflating are high, and save surprise deflations
for periods when the benefits are low.
Cukierman and Meltzer's complete model involves an infinite
horizon, with serially-correlated preference shocks. The public34
never directly observes the central bank's preferences, butis
able to infer something about them from thepath of the money
supply. By intentionally adopting an imprecisemonetary control
procedure, the central bank is able to obscure its preferences.
It gains via the channel illustrated above, but itloses because
inaccurate monetary control raises the varianceof inflation.
(The reader will have to look to Cukierman andMeltzer's article
for further details.)
Cukierman and Meltzer focus on equilibria in whichthe
public forms its beliefs using a linear feedback rule.They show
that there is a unique equilibriujn of thistype; the equilibriujn
is analogous to a one-shotgame equilibriiam in the sense that all
the dynamics come from the internal structureof the model. They
do not prove that there are no other classesof equilibria,
however. Given the fact that their modelincorporates an
infinite horizon, and given the pervasive informationasymmetries
in its structure, the issue of uniqueness wouldseem to be a
serious one. However, a question for futureresearch is whether
(for some variant of the model) the linearequilibrium might be
unique within a broader class of equilibria,say for example, the
class of equilibria in which the public'sexpectations are
continuous in the observed variables. The resultsof Stanford
(1986) suggest posing this question.
It seems possible that the central bank's decisionto
obfuscate its behavior might depend on whetheror not the public
can coordinate on a relatively cooperative equilibrium.As35
Canzoneri's model illustrates, private information impedes the
attainment of the pareto-efficient equilibrium, since its
enforcement requires occasional reversionary periods. So
although obfuscation might be a good move for a central bank
perpetually caught in the worst equilibrium (in which the
inflationary bias is large), it might not be a good move in an
economy which coordinates on a low inflation equilibrium.
The models of Canzoneri and of Cukierman and Meltzer have
somewhat different implications for monetary reform. If the
information structure is exogenous, then one needs to be
concerned about how to deal with the private information problem
in any legislative solution to the inflation problem. Cukierman
and Meltzer's analysis, on the other hand, suggests that the
extent to which private information is a problem may itself be a
function of the legal and institutional structure.36
V.COORDINATION WITH MULTIPLE CONTROLLERS
HereI briefly discuss a couple of questions which arise
when the public faces more than one governmentagency or
sovereign. Allowing for multiple controllers adds an interesting
new dimension of strategic complexity to the analysis.
Alesina (1985) analyzes a model in which there are two
political parties, with different preferences over the relative
importance of inflation and unemployment. There is exogenous
uncertainty over the outcome of the election, making it difficult
for voters to forecast the post-election inflation rate. The
induced volatilty in post-election output and inflation is such
that both parties would be better off (on average) if they could
agree on a consensus inflation policy. But if the winner of the
election always behaves myopically, it will breakany such
agreement. Alesina demonstrates that in the infinite-horizon
case, a more efficient outcome may be achieved via reputation.
In fact, if the two parties have low enough discount rates, then
it is possible to have an equilibrium in which post-election
inflation rate volatility is completely eliminated. What
supports the "cooperative" equilibrium is that the winning party
believes that if it defects, then the next time the opposition
party gains power, it, too, will choose its own most preferred
inflation rate.17
Rogoff (1985) analyzes a two-country model in which each
country's monetary authority faces a credibility problem vis-a-37
vis its own private sector. Thecredibility problem is similar
to that of the model described in section IIabove. However,
there are also strategic interactions betweenthe two sovereign
monetary authorities. What creates an overlap in theirobjective
functions is that when eithercountry (unilaterally) increases
its money supply (by more than theprivate sectors anticipated),
it causes its real exhange rate (vis-a-visthe other country) to
depreciate. (This is a robust result which obtainsacross a
broad class of open-economy macroeconomicmodels.) The central
banks tend to regard this as an undesirableconsequence of
conducting an unanticipated inflation. First, realexchange rate
depreciation affects output adversely if the foreigngood enters
as an intermediate good in the production function,or if wages
are indexed to a basket which includes the foreigngood.(The
main results obtain with either an islands modelor a contracting
model.) Second, a depreciation in the real exchangerate raises
the rate of CPI inflation.
In the one-shot game, both governments canactually make
themselves worse of f by coordinating theirmonetary policies (via
a legally fixed exchange rate or via a monetary union).By
coordinating their monetary policies, they remove a checkon
themselves. The private sectors recognize this whenforming
their inflationary expectations, and the time-consistentrate of
inflation actually rises. The same result holds ina repeated
game if the public is unable to coordinate on the optimal
trigger-strategy equilibriui, or if the monetary authorities have38
high discount rates.18Thus institutional reforms aimed at
promoting government to government cooperation must be designed
with private sector responses in mind. Kehoe (1985) extends
these results to show that government to government tax policy
cooperation can also be counterproductive. Again, the main theme
is that competition between governments may be beneficial by
mitigating their credibility problems vis-a-vis the private
sector.39
CONCLUSIONS
It would seem reasonable to suppose that reputational
considerations temper the government's incentives to conduct
surprise inflations. However, while considerable progress has
been made in introducing reputation into models of monetary
policy, there are still some important unanswered questions. The
most disturbing feature of the models proposed to date is that
either the equilibrium is very sensitive to changes in the
informational structure, or/and there are a multiplicity of
equilibria. There would appear to be substantial coordination
problems involved in achieving the most favorable reputational
equilibria. Crawford (1985) has observed that in some
situations, strategic uncertainty --uncertaintyabout which
equilibrium strategy other agents are adopting --maybe just as
important as uncertainty about exogenous factors. [See also
Axelrod (1984).] The fact that the current generation of
repeated game models do not place sharp restrictions on the data
makes it difficult to apply them with confidence.
It may be possible to construct an argument that certain
equilibria are "focal". Perhaps the government can aid in the
coordination problem by, for example, announcing monetary
targets. But this line of reasoning is tenuous and in some
sense, runs counter to whole thrust of the rational expectations
revolution. The public is much more likely to be influenced by
governmental announcements which are backed by concrete measures.
Another, perhaps more promising, approach to eliminating some40
equilibria in these models would be to search forrefinements in
the equilibrium concept. If, forexample, one could provide a
strong argument for assuming that the public'sexpectations about
future inflation are continuous in current inflation(an
assumption which seems quite plausible), this might ruleout many
of the reputational equilibria discussed in thetext. Other
approaches include allowing for more heterogeneity in theprivate
sector, and introducing more institutional detail. Until
reputational models of monetary policy can be refined toyield
sharper predictions, it would seem premature to focus attention
only on the most favorable equilibria. it iscertainly too soon
to conclude that reputatjona]. constraintssubstantially vitiate
the case for imposing legal constraintson monetary policy, as
some have inferred.
Although there are reasons why one cannot yet be satisfied
with extant models of strategicmonetary policy, they represent a
clear improvement over early rationalexpectations models, in
which the government's behavior was treatedas exogenous.
Whereas it may be constructive to ignorestrategic factors in
studying some macroeconomic phenomenon, they are central tothe
analysis of the government's role in theeconomy. A major appeal
of strategic macro models is that they allowone to formally
model political and institutional relationships whichpreviously
could only be discussed informally.
in my effort to highlight certain generalmodelling issues,
i have not focussed on institutional details.But it is41
ultimately important to take these details intoaccount in
constructing an applied strategic monetary policymodel.42
APPENDIX
Insection iii, we Consideredsome attempts to adapt Kreps
and Wilson's (1982) sequentialequilibrium model of reputation to
analyze monetary policy credibility.One mildly unattractive
feature of these models is that theirequilibria involve
randomizing strategies. It seems implausibleto think that the
central bank decides when to startinflating based on the outcome
of a sequence of coin flips.Another drawback to the models is
that they allow only for twotypes of policymakers. In this
(essentially self-contained) appendix, ipresent an alternative
formulation in which there area continuum of types, and for
which there does exist apure-strategy (sequential)
equilibri.i9 Otherwise, themodel generally yields
qualitatively equivalent results to the modelssurveyed in the
text, though there are some further differences.For example,
the results concerning thepath of conditional expected inflation
differ somewhat from those ofBarro (1986). Also, the analysis
illustrates how there can bemultiple sequential equilibria in
this type of model unless oneplaces restrictions on beliefs
about of f the equilibriuj path behavior.
In the models of Tabellini (1983)and Barro (1986),
policymakers differ according to how muchit costs them to break
a commitment never to inflate. Thesestudies do not go into
detail about just what form sucha commitment might take. One
natural possibility would be for thelegislature to pass a law43
dictating the rate of growth of a monetary aggregate. Such a
commitment should not necessarily be treated as absolute; there
are any number of reasons why the central bank might inflate in
spite of such a law. First of all, the central bank (or some
special interest group) might be able to challenge the law's
constitutionality. Or, if the penalties are not sufficiently
severe, the central bank may simply be willing to pay the price
for violating the law. Even if it proves impossible to revoke or
ignore the law, the central bank could still try to circumvent it
via regulatory changes which influence the transactions demand
for money. Such regulatory changes might involve deleterious
microeconomic side-effects, but the central bank may be willing
to tolerate such inefficiencies in order to reap the benefits of
unanticipated inflation. Finally, depending on how the law is
structured, there is always the possibility that the legislature
will decide to back off and repeal the law if the central bank
ever actually inflates. In each of the scenarios described
above, one could argue that the central bank has some private
information about the disutility it will receive if it breaks the
law.
In Barro's model, the cost to the central bank of breaking
its zero-inflation commitment takes on one of two extreme values:
zero or prohibitive. The central bank knows its cost type,
whereas the public only knows the distribution of types. Here I
modify Barro's model to allow the cost of reneging to take on a
continuum of values.44
The policymaker has a finite-horizon loss function givenby
T
= ZL5(rt,rte,cfl3s , 1/2< C 1, (Al)
L[n,(Ue),c] =- [itt-(Re)]+ f(ltt)2 (A2)
+ tZ(c, itt, Tht_1, t—2'"),
where Z =cif itt 0and it_ =0for all i >0; Z =0
otherwise. In other words, the central bank bears a fixed one-
time cost to reneging on its commitment never to inflate. (This
cost might be associated with the cost of repealing the law. One
way to justify the finite-horizon would be to assume that the law
has a known expiration date. Or, perhaps it is known that at
some future date, a new transactions technology will come on line
which will render meaningless the definition of money embodied in
the lawj2° As in Barro's and Tabellini's analyses, the public
does not directly observe c. At time zero, the public only knows
that c [0,p.], where '>1; it has uniform priors over this
interval. In subsequent periods, the public uses Bayes rule to
update its priors in a manner we shall specify shortly.
Because the central bank bears only a one-time fixed cost to
repealing its zero-inflation commitment, then it must be true
that (ne) =it'=1if rt 0for any 5< t, where rt is the
(here unique) equilibrium level of inflation in the one-shot
game. After the central bank inflates once, the 3 function for
future periods (3 =0)becomes common knowledge, and there is a
unique equilibrium because of the finite horizon. Thus if the45
central bank is going to inflate at all in the current period t,
then it should choose itt so as to minimize its current-period
loss function; expected future inflation will equal rL* for any
0. Thus one can deduce
Proposition 1: t =0or itt =1for all t.
Proposition 1 holds, of course, only because of the special form
of the loss function (A2), in which it -1eenters linearly, and
in which 2 can only take on one of two values, c or 0.
Definition: 0t e c(ite)Iml,u_27.. .0}
is the public's expectation of inflation in period t, given that
the central bank has not broken its commitment prior to t.
Clearly a ￿ 1, since by proposition 1, it will equal zero or
one in any period t. Temporarily treating the path of a as
exogenous, we can calculate the loss to the central bank if it
follows a strategy of setting it =0in periods 0 through t -1,
and it =1in periods t through T:
1
I'(t,c) =2 a5 + 13t[(c -1)12+ at] + 42 , (A3)
C. ttl
Note that F(t,c) is continuous and monotonically increasing in c.
From (A3), we can immediately deduce two important facts: First,46
Proposition 2: If t =0for all t < T, then ItT =1if c C 1,
and itT =0if c ￿ 1.
Proposition 2 follows from (A3); r(T,c)E as c1. In
other words, if the cost to the central bank of breaking its
commitment is less than one, then it will certainly be inflating
by the final period T. Conversely, we can similarly deduce that
no type c > 1 will inflate for the first time in the final period
T. However, without further restrictions on (a}, we cannot yet
rule out the possibility that types c > 1 will begin inflating
before period T. This point will turn out to be crucial in our
later discussion of the uniqueness of equilibrium.
We can also deduce from (A3) that a high cost type would
never begin inflating in an earlier period than a low cost type
would. Holding {a} fixed, the higher the cost to the central
bank of breaking its commitment, the more incentive it has to
wait to incur this cost.
Proposition 3:[r(t11c2) —I'(t2,c2)]> [r(t1,c1) —r(t2,c1)],
for c2 > c1 and t2 > t1.






for 3 C 1, where m t2 -4.
Withthe above results, we are now prepared to discuss the
evolution of 0t. In a sequential equilibrium, the public's




where ô E sup{ô[O,u]Ic < a implies F(t + i,c) > r(t,c)
for all i such that 0 < i ￿ T -t].
Thus all types c < at will begin inflating in period t if
they have not already begun inflating in an earlier period. The
denominator of (AS) represents the range of costtypes which the
public believes would not have inflated prior to period t. The
numerator represents the range of cost types which the public
believes will inflate for the first time in period t (in which
case they will set it =1).(AS) gives the expected inflation
rate, conditional on past inflation being uniformlyzero, because
the public has uniform priors over c. Since proposition 3
implies that &mustbe nondecreasing in t, (A5) is the only
possible form for rational expectations.
It is natural to look for an equilibrium in which =1.
For if the time horizon were only one period (T =0),then the
unique sequential equilibrium would obviously be [by
proposition 2 and (AS)], a =1/j.i.and a =1.If the cost to the
central bank of breaking its commitment is greater thanone, then
it will not inflate even in a one-shotgame. In a multi-period48
game, the central bank must bear an additional cost if it
inflates before period T. For then the central bank not only has
to bear the one-time reneging cost, c, but it also must live with
high expected inflation (rte =1)in all future periods.
We will proceed by showing that a necessary and sufficient
condition for a sequential equilibrium with 8T =1is that the
path of Ôt must be governed by the recursion relationship
r(t,a) -lit+1,a)> 0, if ôt =0,
=0,if ô >0. (A6)
That the recursion (A6) is a sufficient condition for
equilibrium is a straightforward consequence of proposition 3
together with the continuity of r in c; the proof will be
ornmitted. [The proof involves showing that when faced with
expectations of inflation governed by (AS) and (A6), all types
c C would prefer to first inflate in period t over first
inflating in some future period, and that no type c > â would
prefer to begin inflating on or before date t.]
To demonstrate that (A6) is a necessary condition for a
sequential equilibrium with aT =1,we first prove that if there
is a sequence of periods during which some types first inflate,
then this sequence cannot be followed by a period(s) where no
type would begin inflating. We then show that (A6) must hold
with equality during any period prior to T in which some types
would begin inflating.49
Lemma 1: In any sequential equilibrium whereu > at > at-i. for
any t C T, then
Comment: The proof of Lemma 1 requires ourassumption in (Al)
that 3 > 1/2.
Proof: Suppose, in contradiction to theLemma, that there is
some time t < T such that = >at_i. Now this cannot be
an equilibrium unless r(t,at) ￿ lit + 1,o) and, by(AS),
=0.But by (A3), if =0,then
r'(t,a) nt+i,a) =
N1 + + )/2 -6N1 + a)/2. (A7)
But the RHS of (A7) must be positive for ô ? 0 if> 1/2.
Proposition 4:(A6) must hold with equality in any period t such
that Ôt_i < a < for t C T.
Proof: In any such period t, there must existsome a > 0, s.t.
for 0 C 8 C a, any type a ô inflates first inperiod t, and
any type a + ô inflates first in period t + 1. The proposition
then follows from the fact that n'(t,c) is continuous and
monotonically increasing in c.
Lemma 1 and proposition 4 together imply that (A6)must hold
during any period t C T such that a > 0. That (A6) must hold
with inequality over the initial periods where a =0can be50
confirmed directly from (A3).
We are now ready to characterize the equilibrium governed by
(A6). Combining (A3) and (A6), we obtain
[—1+ ât(1 —f3)]/2=°t+1
—1). (AS)
Substituting (A5) into (AS) yields 21
ât+l =F(at)=
[( - 1)/2J(ât)2+ ([j(l -) +13/2)ot + (i -u/2). (A9)
Via direct differentiation, we can confirm that paths which obey
(A9) also satisfy Lemma 1:
dôt+i/dat =[js(1—) +1 —2(1—13)ât]/213> 0, (AlO)
since t>1, and Ôt1 if ÔT =1.
To prove existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
characterized by the fundamental recursion (A6) (together with
the terminal condition ÔT =1),we invert eq. (A9) to solve for
ô in terms of
at =F3(ôt+i)=[u(1—) +111(2 —2)
([u(1—) + i]2 —4(1—)[2i3at+i
—is(213—1H}1/(2—2f3).(All)51
From (All), it is readily confirmed that ifp. >1and 3 >1/2,
then for 0 ￿ Ôt÷l S 1, F1 hasexactly one real root less than
one. Moreover, F(at+i) < [this also follows directly from
(AlO)]. By (A6), an eguilibriun path isgoverned by (A9) only
where a >o.Tracing the equilibrium backwards from timeT, if
there comes a point where â1.1 is such thatF2(at+i) <0,then
=0for all s S t. That this is indeedan equilibrium is
readily confirmed. By (A9), or by (All), F' c 0 ifand only if
Ct+l <- p.12(3.
(A12)
By setting ôt =0and °t+l =ôt+l/uin (A8), we see that
condition (A12) provides the maximum levelof â1 such that a
type zero would not choose to inflate for the firsttime at t.
The equilibriujn is unique becausealong the path obtained by
using (All) to trace back from =1,there is only one a >0
such that (A12) holds. This rulesany path where a type zero
waits even longer to first inf late,so that ô jumps directly from
a =0to some higher a on the path leadingup to =1.
To prove existence, it is sufficient to showthat when we
trace (All) backwards from time T, therecan only be a finite
number of periods where a > 0. From(AlO), we have
=— (1—t3)/(3< 0. (A13)
By (Ala) and (A13), F"(at+i) > 0. Thisimplies that52
CT_k -CT_k_iis increasing in k; as as we solve for the path of
ô working backwards from the terminal conditionCT =1,c must
indeed become zero in finite time. Thus an equilibrium always
exists. It also follows that if the time horizon T is long
enough, then there will be no chance of inflation early on in the
policymakers' term.
Figure 1 presents a graph of eq. (A9), and traces out the
equilibriun path leading to the terminal condition,CT =1.The
condition 1 > 1/2 insures that the curve intersects the â4.1 axis
at a positive value. The condition 1 > ji. -u/213insures that the
intercept is less than one. [From (A12), this is the
necessary and sufficient condition for ÔT_1 > 0.1
An immediate implication of Lemma 1 together with equation
(A8) is ds/dt > 0 for a > 0. Whether or not a given cost type
chooses to initiate inflation in any given period depends on the
opportunity cost. The higher the lower the opportunity
cost to inflating in the current period. It does not take as
high a to tempt a low cost type to begin inflation. Over
time, a must rise so that higher and higher cost types are
tempted to break away. This scenario is somewhat different than
the one in Barro (1986), which was discussed in section III.
Observe that by (A8) and (A13), a rises at a decreasing rate.
We have shown that there exists a unique sequential
equilibrium with ÔT =1.Can there exist other sequential
equilibria with ÔT1? Candidate equilibria with ÔT < 1 are








1 < CT < i' are ruled out by applying propositions 3 together with
Lemma 1. Proposition 3 states that no type c > 1 will ever first
inflate in the final period, and Lemma 1 proves that if Ôzp C is,
then some types must inflate for the first time in the final
period. However, the results contained in this appendix are
insufficient to preclude sequential equilibrium paths in which
ÔT = s. Suppose, for example, that the time horizon, T, is very
large, and the public's beliefs are: (The)0 = 1, and = 1 for
all 1 S s < T. If the policymaker does not inflate in period 0,
he will, by (A2), suffer a loss of 1 in period zero. If c > 1,
this loss is less than the loss he receives by inflating in
period 0, 1/2 + c/2. However, if the public maintains its
beliefs, he will lose 1 again in period 1. This is greater than
his loss would be in period 1 had he inflated in period zero
(1/2). He will be worse off (by 1/2) in each ensuing period
until he gives in. Hence, if the policymaker does not inflate in
period 0, it may still be rational for the public to believe that
he will inflate for certain in period 1. For any value of ji,
thereis a T large enough so that this type of equilibrium cannot
be ruled out as sequential. (Conversely, for any T, there is a is
large enough so that the equilibrium is unique.) Note that we
could definitely preclude such equilibria if the public's priors
are that c is uniformly distributed on [0,1] with probability
1/(1 + is), and c = Co with probability is/(1 + is).In this case,
which would be more directly analogous to the model of Milgrom
and Roberts (1982), the unique sequential equilibrium is the one54
illustrated in figure 1.) If there is a secondequilibriwn in
pure strategies, then it may not be possible to rule out mixed
strategy equilibria.
The basic problem is that the sequential equilibriumconcept
does not place constraints on how the public mustinterpret
events which occur with probability measure zero on the
equilibrium path. Unless some types c >1are "robots" (as is
the case where c =— isa possibility), then their actions can be
influenced by bizarre public beliefs. It is possible,however,
that one may be able to rule out the "perverse" equilibrium
described above by appealing to a refinement of sequential
equilibrium.22
In conclusion, I should point out that although the finite-
horizon model discussed in this appendix improveson earlier
models in a couple of dimensions, it still sharessome of their
major deficiencies (as discussed in section II of the text). In
particular, if different types of policymakers have different
preferences instead of different costs to breaking commitments,
then there might exist separating equilibria in whichsome types
deflate. In a more general setting, theremay well be other ways
for types to separate themselves. Also, it is difficultto take
the finite-horizon assumption literally, and some of theresults
may be sensitive to this assumption.55
FOOTNOTES
1.Fischer (1986) and Cukierman (1985) have recently provided
excellent surveys of the monetary policy credibility literature.
The emphasis here is quite different, and therefore this study
should be viewed as a complement rather than a substitute for
these earlier surveys.
2. See Kydland and Prescott (1977), and Calvo (1978). Phelps
(1967), and Phelps and Pollak (1968) anticipated some of the
basic themes underlying the modern time consistency literature.
3. For a discussion of the relationship between time consistency
and subgame perfection, see Fershtman (1986). Subgame perfect
equilibrium (or more generally, sequential equilibrium), will be
the equilibrium construct used here.
4. It is possible to restate the analysis below in terms of an
overlapping generations version of the model pesented in section
I of Fischer's (1986) survey. For efforts along these lines, see
Atkeson (1986) or Kehoe (1985).
5. In the underlying structural model, money can have real
effects either because of confusion between local and aggregate
disturbances, or because there are imperfectly-indexed wage
contracts. In the former case, there must be a temporal lag in
the diffusion of aggregate information.
6.It is difficult to argue that anticipated inflation has an
effect of the same order of magnitude as unanticipated inflation.
(There are the "shoe-leather" costs resulting from lower holdings
of real money balances. Also, there may be some activities, such
as income tax accounting, which are costly to properly index.)
Our analysis does not require that the welfare effect of
anticipated inflation be large.
7. The specification (1), though used throughout the literature,
is not entirely satisfactory for stochastic versions of the
model. For then, if the level of inflation and the aggregate
prediction error do affect the individual's utility function
(because of externalities), he must take into account the
covariance of these factors with his own price prediction error.56
8. In a stochastic version of the model, thecentral bank may
choose to cause price-predictionerrors, though private sector
expectations will be correct on average. [See Barro andGordon
(1983a) or Rogoff (1985b).]
9. Because f", g" > 0, the same results wouldobtain if we
replaced (4) with the weaker c9ndition: (ne) =ftif
, and(ne) =it otherwise.In the private
information example studied in sectionIV, it is necessary to make this modification.
10.If f() =(it - e-k)2,g() =it2, and3 =1,then ft =0is
a trigger-strategy equilibrium under (4).
11. It is easy to prove that zero inflation isalways attainable
if the time interval between periods is smallenough, provided
that the length of the punishment interval isunrestricted. In
(1) and (2), we have arbitrarily set the time intervalat one.
As the interval approaches zero, thetransitory output gains from
defecting become very short lived, whereas the punishmentcan be
held constant. [Grossman and Van Huyck make thispoint in the
context of an optimal seigniorage model. Their resultrequires
the restriction that there be some maximum rateat which the
central bank can print money. However, the constraint isnot
binding along the equilibrium path, unless one introducesprivate information as in section IV.] Hence, ifone chooses to
rationalize (1) and (2) via an islands model, thena zero
inflation rate is always attainable unless there isan explicit
time lag in the diffusion of aggregate information.
12. Again, it is possible to define defections interms of
inequalities instead of equalities, but this does not makeany
qualitative difference in the case of symmetric information.
13. Some have criticized Barro and Gordon'strigger-strategy
equilibrium as being subject to a "free rider" problem. This
criticism is not well-founded.As the discussion in the text
makes clear, the equilibrium is indeed Nash. Theremight be a
free rider problem if it wasnecessary to raise funds to improve
coordination of private-sector expectations.
14.whether the central bank actually hasany private
macroeconomic information is debatable. If the central bank's
forecast of money demand is based entirelyon publicly available
data, then the private sector should be able to construct the
same forecast. It might be argued that the central bank has much
faster access to data on bank deposits, and that thisinformation
is only released to the public with a long lag. Ofcourse, if
the central bank does not discount the future tooheavily, then
even the lagged release of data is still sufficient to have
trigger-strategy equilibria similar to those analyzed in section
II.57
15. The Keynesian flavor of Canzoneri'.s analysis is not an
essential ingredient. Barro and Gordon (1983a) discuss how to
extend their model to the case where the monetary authority has
imperfect control over the inflation rate, and where its control
error is private information. They, too, consider the class of
equilibria identified by Green and Porter (1984). In their
paper, however, they do not present their formal results.
16. Canzoneri only presents the first-order conditions necessary
to sustain an equilibrium with zero expected inflation. The
second-order conditions obtain because of restrictions on the
concavity of the distribution function of the monetary
authorities' forecast error.
17. Roberds (1985) gives a political interpretation to his model
of "stochastic replanning", in which the preferences of the
government randomly evolve over time. Alesina and Tabellini
(1985) provide a framework for analyzing the case where competing
political interests control different aspects of macroeconomic
policy.
18. Oudiz and Sachs (1985) consider repeated game solution
concepts in a two-country framework. In their example, and in
the stochastic version of Rogoff (1985a), cooperation between
governments can be beneficial.
19. The general approach builds on that of Milgrom and Roberts
(1982). Wood (1986) has applied the Milgrom-Roberts model to the
problem of speculative attacks in the foreign exchange market.
20. The analysis would only have to be modified slightly if the
fixed cost to inflating had to be paid every period that the
central bank inflates. To allow for the case where the cost of
inflating depends on the level of inflation would have to involve
a more substantial modification.
21. If we modify the analysis so that Z(rt) =cfor it0,
for any history of it,therecursion equation (A8) becomes
(Fl) Ct+l = — (1/2)}+[(ji + 1)/213]at—(at)2/2
There exists a sequential equilibrium very similar to the one
analyzed in the main text.
22. See, for example, Cho and Kreps (1986).58
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